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Abstract 
This article attempts to answer the question: why are women not often at the head 
of nations? We test the probability of occurrence of female leaders at the head of 
the country using data from ARCHIGOS data set of Goemans et al. (2009). Our 
hypothesis is that the occurrence of female leaders as head of government is also 
determined by culture. This hypothesis is validated empirically. Hence, we tested 
the strength of this relationship, which proved to be highly robust. 
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0. Introduction 
The determinants of female political leadership constitute a highly debated issue 
in the literature. However, this literature is particularly devoted to the legislature 
(eg Austen and Mavisakalyan, 2016, Kodila-Tedika, 2013), leaving aside 
women's leadership in the executive branch. The goal of this research is precisely 
to complete this theoretical vacuum. Why are some countries headed by female 
leaders, others not? Are not these differences due to cultural differences? This is 
the question that our quest attempts to answer. 
We use Hofstede's (2001) cultural data on the degree of masculinity in each 
country in the context of cross-countries and data from ARCHIGOS (Goemans et 
al., 2009). From this last database, we built dummies for the countries where a 
woman was at the head of the executive in 2010. Given the nature of this 
variable, we have thus used a probit model. The probability of having a woman at 
the head of the executive is due to culture. This conclusion is robustness. We 
conducted several tests. We changed the years when a woman was at the head of 
the executive, changed the sample and the estimation technique. Given the likely 
error in measuring masculinity, omission bias, and inverse causality, we used 
instrumental econometrics for this purpose and culture determines the selection of 
women at the head of the executive. 
The contribution of this article can be placed in the context of a growing literature 
examining the effect of different cultural dimensions on economic outcomes (for 
a review, see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; Alesina and Giuliano 2015). Aussi, 
elle est une contribution sur la littérature récente qui considère les traits 
psychologiques et les caractéristiques individuelles des leaders (e.g. Kodila-
Tedika & Mulunda Kabange, 2016). 
The rest of the article is split in five sections. The first section presents a brief 
review of the literature on the consequences of culture on various variables with 
the consideration of empirical studies based solely on data from Hofstede (1980, 
2001). The second section develops arguments in favour of our hypothesis. 
Section three presents the data and the results found.  The sensitivity and / or 
robustness tests are described in Section four. Finally, we draw a conclusion in 
the last section. 
1. Literature Review 
Recent studies have considered the cultural effects of individualism. Nikolaev et 
al. (2017) suggest that societies with more individualistic values have a 
significantly lower net income inequality. The results are robust even after 
controlling for many factors such as economic development, legal origins, 
religion, human capital, other cultural values, economic institutions and 
geographic controls. By integrating the cultural dimensions of individualism and 
masculinity. Aggarwal et al. (2013) show how the cultural traits of countries of 
origin, and the cultural distances separating them, interact with geographic 
distance and other gravity variables, find previously unreported effects and show 
that if gravity still discourages portfolio investment (FPI), aspects of culture and 
cultural distance can compensate for this by supporting the REIT Using World 
Economic Forum survey data for more than eighty countries.  
Aggarwal et al (2014) examine the determinants of (1) access to equity financing, 
(2) access to debt financing, (3) access to venture capital and (4) overall access to 
capital. Access to finance is associated with the cultural dimensions of avoidance, 
uncertainty and masculinity. Furthermore, access to finance is positively 
associated with greater wealth and better investor protection. 
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011ab, 2016) found that individualism positively 
affects income and innovation. Davis (2016) for instance argues empirically that 
individual responsibility positively impacts economic development. Kyriacou 
(2016) shows that the effect of individualism on development disappears when 
one credibly controls the quality of governance. This is statistically explained by 
individualism. Licht et al. (2007) also showed that individualism was linked to 
the quality of government. Other scholars such as Davis & Williamson (2016) 
suggest a causal relationship between individualism and regulation of entry. The 
results of Cline & Williamson (2017) show that individualism has a positive and 
significant link to the effectiveness of contract enforcement. Interaction effects, 
however, suggest that democracy amplifies the influence of individualism on the 
effectiveness of contract enforcement. Cline & Williamson (2017) suggests that 
culture is a constraint for policy makers, as any official policy or institutional 
structure will work very differently depending on the cultural environment. 
Other studies have linked individualism to informal institutions. For instance, 
Pitlik & Rode (2017) looked at the impact of individualistic values on personal 
attitudes to government intervention as a potential link of culture and formal 
institutions. They consider that two key elements of an "individualistic culture" 
are particularly relevant for the formation of attitudes, namely the values of self-
determination. The results indicate that the two elements of individualistic values 
are negatively associated with interventionist preferences. Van Hoorn (2014) 
shows that higher individualism is strongly associated with more sophisticated 
management practices. Culture would be an important determinant of 
management practices than formal institutions. This also shows that management 
practices are indeed an important mediator in the empirical link between culture 
and per capita income. 
With a sample of 2069 adult, Linan et al. (2016) argue that individualistic values 
affect entrepreneurial intentions. Pinillos and Reyes (2011) link individualism to 
entrepreneurial activity, considering the level of economic development. The 
results show that a country's entrepreneurship rate is negatively related to 
individualism when development is medium or low and positively related to 
individualism when the level of development is high. Thus, individualism is not 
related to entrepreneurship in the same way in countries with different levels of 
development. 
This vast literature on culture has essentially revolved around the individualized-
collectivist dimension, leaving aside other cultural dimensions, like masculinity, 
Hofstede (1980, 2001) put forward. However, only research by Gorodnichenko 
and Roland (2011ab), Aggarwal et al. (2012), Aggarwal et al. (2014) considered 
the variable culture in conducting econometric analysis without necessarily 
developing an argument around it as it is proposed for individualism. In this 
paper, we complete this literature by considering the effect of masculinity on the 
selection of politicians. 
2. Theoretical motivation 
The political selection theory assumes that citizens are tempted to believe in a 
benevolent planner, in that the preference of citizens should be directed towards 
competent and honest leaders (Besley, 2005, Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011). 
However, the available studies seem to give women a certain honesty (eg Swamy 
et al., 2001, Capezio & Mavisakalyan, 2016) and a strong social preference 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), which translates for example into better results 
in terms of health (eg Mavisakalyan, 2014), education (Clots-Figueras, 2007).  
The evolution of female leaders in the world is shown in Figure 1. It shows the 
ratio of female leader to the number of countries considered in our sample. This 
rate is very low, estimated at about 9%, with nothing changed in the last five 
years. 
Figure 1. Evolution of female leader in word 
 
Source: Author‟s own compilation 
The question of why there are less women as head of state while the democratic 
regime offers the ideal framework for selecting politicians, is essential to address. 
Our hypothesis is that culture makes all the difference. The cultural element 
refers to in this paper is the masculine culture (masculinity) or the patriarchal 
societies. Patriarchal or masculine societies determine, to our understanding, the 
course of women. The masculine culture (masculinity) has indirect and direct 
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effects. Indirectly, the masculine culture deteriorates women's background or 
does not allow them to accumulate a stock of human capital. Indeed, some 
cultural practices, especially in patriarchal or masculine societies, encourage 
families to be reluctant to send girls to school with boys. Some studies have 
shown a significant negative relationship between the proportion of a country's 
Muslim population and its school enrolment rates. The effects are greater for girls 
(Schultz 1987, Boone 1996, Forsythe et al. year). Because of the lack of 
education, women also perpetuate this under-accumulation. In India, for example, 
children whose mothers are more educated study two hours more per day than 
children of less educated mother (Behrman et al., 1999). Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1994) show that school success for mothers has a positive impact on those of 
their children. Because of the lack of human capital stock, women are directly 
dissuaded from politics or from being in politics. Hence, the same behaviour is 
carry on to the next generation of female who struggle to assume a leadership 
role. 
The effects of masculine culture can also be direct. This culture determines the 
political preferences of both society and the woman herself. It determines the 
respective roles of men and women. In the case of a derogation, a whole formal 
and informal system of reprimands and sanctions is triggered (Narayan et al., 
2000). This naturally affects the incentives of women. 
Nowadays, women who are discussing politics are undermined and mistrusted, 
particularly in some older, less educated, and more educated communities 
(Inglehart, 1997). Women are not expected to work outdoors (Jejeebhoy 1995, 
Alderman and King 1998). These different elements consolidate social 
prejudices. It can only reduce the selection of women who wants to run for 
political position.  It is therefore a difficult constraint  to overcome, as much work 
has pointed to ubiquitous oppression and patriarchal control over women 
politicians (Beck 2003, Bratton 1999, Geisler 1995, McEwan 2000, 2003). 
Moreover, the utility function of women can also take a hit as the values 
conveyed by the male or patriarchal culture dissuade women from finding 
satisfaction in politics. This paper leans on the work of Inglehart and Norris 
(2005) who addressed the issue of cultural to influence on the process of gender 
equality. 
3. Data 
The variable of interest in this paper is the female leader. We further built an 
index of the variable female leader of the data base on the ARCHIGOS data set of 
Goemans et al. (2009). We created dummy variables for all countries that were 
led by women in 2010. 
We measure a society‟s position on the Masculinity versus Femininity continuum 
by employing four separate measures of individualism from Hofstede (1980, 
2001). Hofstede (2001) initially used surveys of IBM employees in about 30 
countries to study differences in corporate culture. Hofstede‟s cultural data base 
has been expanded. Hofstede‟s (1980, 2001) cultural data is based on surveys in 
over 100 countries designed to understand differences in corporate culture. To 
avoid cultural biases in the way questions are framed, the translation of the survey 
into local languages was done by a team of English and local language speakers. 
Hofstede uses factor analysis to identify four dimensions of cultural variation – 
individualism, power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance – with the 
individualism score being the highest and most important factor loading.  
The index of masculinity looks at the extent to which a culture supports a 
traditional view of masculine and feminine traits and refers to the dominance of 
men over women and to the dominance of “male” values such as assertiveness 
and competitiveness versus norms of caring and modesty. In Hofstede‟s words, 
“In a strict sense, only behaviours directly connected with procreation 
(childbearing and child begetting) are “feminine” or “masculine.”  Yet, every 
society recognizes many other behaviours as more suitable to females or more 
suitable to males; these represent relatively arbitrary choices, medicated by 
cultural norms and traditions” (Hofstede, 2001: 280). Hofstede (2001: 297) 
defines: “Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly 
distinct: Men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material 
success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the 
quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles 
overlap: Both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned 
with the quality of life.” 
The control data sources and descriptive statistics elements are reproduced in 
Table 1. 
  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variables  Source  Mean Std.Dev. 
Masculinity   Hofstede (2001) 47.490 18.423 
Female of leader  
Author from ARCHIGOS data set of 
Goemans et al. (2009).  .082 .275 
GDP per capita WDI, World Bank. 38.248 38.188 
Globalization  
Economic globalization by using the 
KOF index also used by Dreher (2005) 60.219 18.072 
Institution World Bank Governance indicator -.140 2.206 
School  Barro and Lee (2010) 7.535 2.649 
Africa Author  .283 .452 
Americas Author  .175 .381 
Europa Author  .222 .416 
Asia Author  .253 .436 
Oceania  Author  .067 .250 
4. Baseline Results 
To evaluate the baseline effect of the masculinity culture on female leaders of 
country i, we estimate the following model using a probit: 
                                       for all i= 1,…, N (1) 
where         is the level of masculinity in a country‟s,   is a vector of controls 
for economic and institutional characteristics of countries defined in section 2, 
and   i is a disturbance term.  
The Probit estimates of equation 1 are presented in Table 2. In the first column, 
we simply estimated a relationship between our variable to explain and our 
variable of interest. The level of masculinity appears as an important variable in 
predicting the likelihood of a woman leading a country's executive. In column 2, 
we controlled for other variables to mitigate the omission bias. The behaviour of 
our variable of interest remains the same. It is possible that regional or continental 
specificities may affect this result. In the last column, we catered for fixed effects 
related to continents. The finding suggests almost similar results obtained in 
previous tests, with the coefficient of the variable of interest becoming more 
important. According to the marginal effects reported in the last column of Table 
2, an increase in the masculine culture level of 10% degrades by 4 percentage 
points the probability that a woman will arrive at the head of a country, ceteris 
paribus. 
Table 2.  Female leader and Masculinity (Probit) 
 
I II III 
Marginal effects from 
probit estimation  
 
Masculinity -0,017* -0,016* -0,020* -.004 
 
(0,009) (0,010) (0,011) 
 Globalization 
 
-0,024 -0,026 -.005 
  
(0,019) (0,023) 
 GDP per capita 
 
-0,009* -0,010* -.002 
  
(0,005) (0,006) 
 School 
 
0,125 0,154 .032 
  
(0,118) (0,150) 
 Institution 
 
0,156 0,215 .044 
  
(0,158) (0,169) 
 fix continental effect No No Yes 
 Intercept  -0,396 0,353 0,407 
 
 
(0,412) (1,213) (1,726) 
 Obs 104 82 71 
 Pseudo-R2 0.0495  0.1349 0.1738 
 note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
   
The predictive quality of our model is remarkable. Indeed, for the countries that 
have known female leader, about 75% have been well predicted. The prediction 
rate for females leading countries as well as for male-dominated countries is 
85.92%. 
5 Robustness 
As shown in Table 1, we use several approaches such as, the change in estimation 
technique (5.1), the exclusion of continents (5.2), the transformation of the 
masculinity variable (5.3) and the change in the years when the woman was at the 
head of the executive and the reduction of the sample size to only democratic 
countries (5.4). 
5.1 Change of estimation technique 
In Table 3, we use a linear probability model. The conclusions remain the similar 
to Table 2: both female leader and masculinity have the same nature of 
relationship. The change in technique did not affect the concluding results. 
However, the only difference found on is the level of confidence that is now 95% 
overall. 
Table 3.  Female of leader and Masculinity: linear probability model 
 
I II III 
Masculinity -0,004** -0,004* -0,004** 
 
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
Globalization 
 
-0,005 -0,004 
  
(0,004) (0,004) 
GDP per capita 
 
-0,002* -0,002* 
  
(0,001) (0,001) 
School 
 
0,022 0,022 
  
(0,023) (0,028) 
Institution 
 
0,033 0,038 
  
(0,031) (0,032) 
fix continental effect No No Yes 
Intercept 0,294*** 0,512** 0,419 
 
(0,089) 
(0,241 
) 
(0,256) 
Obs 104 82 82 
R2 0,039 0,114 0,158 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
   
 
5.2 Exclusion of continents 
Table 4 below presents a further robustness check in which we exclude 
continents. The idea consist of assessing the behaviour of the variables of interest 
(masculinity) when a continent is excluded from the sample. This is also a means 
of controlling for extreme values that could influence the baseline findings. The 
relatively lower correlation coefficient observed when continents are excluded 
implies that the excluded continent has a higher level of female leaders‟ 
development. In the same line of intuition, a relatively higher correlation 
coefficient upon the exclusion of a continent means the excluded continent has a 
larger variation and more related variables to female leaders.  
Overall, the result does not change because the sign is the same with almost the 
same magnitude for the coefficient of the variable masculinity. However, since 
the continents America, Asia and Europe are alternately excluded, the statistical 
significance disappears. 
Table 4. Exclusion of continents (Probit) 
 
Exclusion 
Oceania  
Exclusion 
Africa  
Exclusion 
Americas  
 Exclusion 
Asia  
Exclusion 
Europa  
Masculinity -0,018* -0,016* -0,016 -0,015 -0,025 
 
(0,010) (0,010) (0,011) (0,011) (0,017) 
Globalization -0,025 -0,028 -0,040 -0,021 -0,014 
 
(0,021) (0,020) (0,025) (0,026) (0,024) 
GDP per capita -0,009* -0,009* -0,010 -0,013* -0,004 
 
(0,005) (0,005) (0,006) (0,007) (0,007) 
School 0,141 0,089 0,078 0,118 0,305* 
 
(0,133) (0,123) (0,134) (0,151) (0,169) 
Institution 0,119 0,170 0,332 0,230 -0,039 
 
(0,163) (0,158) (0,223) (0,202) (0,206) 
Intercept 0,407 1,010 1,402 0,046 -1,113 
 
(1,221) (1,288) (1,557) (1,674) (1,531) 
Number of observations 79 71 64 64 50 
Pseudo-R2  0.1325 0.1273 0.1788 0.1946  0.1718 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
      
5.3 Robustness with Transformation of interest variable  
In Table 5, we replicate the estimations of the last column of Table 2 with 
emphasis on extreme observations. The two-transformation employed are 
Logarithm (Column 1) and Box-Cox transformation (Column 2) (Box and Cox, 
1964). We notice that the variable of interest remains consistently significant with 
the same negative sign, but with an improved coefficient. The level of 
masculinity always decreases the probability of a woman to lead. 
Table 5. Robustness with Transformation of interest variable (Probit) 
 
Log of 
Masculinity 
Box-Cox 
transform 
Masculinity -0,633* 
 
 
(0,332) 
 
Masculinity 
 
-0,019* 
  
(0,010) 
Globalization -0,022 -0,026 
 
(0,023) (0,023) 
GDP per capita -0,010* -0,010* 
 
(0,006) (0,006) 
School 0,110 0,154 
 
(0,147) (0,150) 
Institution 0,197 0,216 
 
(0,169) (0,169) 
fix continental effect Yes Yes 
Intercept 2,105 0,381 
 
(2,110) (1,723) 
Number of observations 71 71 
R2  0.1716  0.1738 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
  
5.4 Sensitivity checks 
Dummy variables for women-led countries, are created for the year 2010 in this 
paper. This choice is arbitrary. It is therefore possible that this may affect the 
conclusions to be drawn. With that, we created dummy variables for other years, 
2011 to 2015. 
Table 6 returns the results with the change of years between 2011 and 2015. For 
column 1, the results refer to the year 2011 and column 2 to the year 2012, till 
2015. The concluding findings  remain unchanged in most of the years, except for 
the year 2013. 
Table 6.  Female of leader and Masculinity: Year (Probit) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Masculinity -0,027** -0,026** -0,010 -0,019** -0,019* 
 
(0,011) (0,011) (0,009) (0,009) (0,011) 
Globalization -0,024 -0,011 -0,013 -0,019 -0,047* 
 
(0,024) (0,022) (0,020) (0,020) (0,026) 
GDP per capita -0,012** -0,010** -0,005 -0,004 -0,012* 
 
(0,006) (0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,006) 
School 0,029 0,026 0,069 0,130 0,199 
 
(0,153) (0,138) (0,128) (0,129) (0,170) 
Institution 0,266 0,156 0,112 0,079 0,204 
 
(0,176) (0,162) (0,147) (0,146) (0,174) 
Effet fixe continental Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  1,986 1,375 0,080 0,204 1,503 
 
(1,783) (1,680) (1,574) (1,416) (1,782) 
Obs 71 82 82 79 68 
Pseudo-R2 0.2270 0.1963 0.0931 0.1245 0.2072 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
     
In Table 7, we maintain the same sensitivity test on by considering the year 2010 
and reducing our sample size. The exclusion of other countries is dictated by the 
fact that they are not considered democratic. To determine the democratic 
countries of the non-democratic, we considered the classification of Cheibub et 
al. (2010). The sample change is dictated by the theory of political selection 
summarized above. Following this argument, the democratic regimes are the ones 
to select the leaders with these abilities. However, we indicated that the results for 
women are of great value. It was therefore expected that democratic regimes 
could promote female leadership. The results obtained are indifferent from the 
previous ones  
Table 7.  Female of leader and Masculinity: Year (Probit) 
 
2010 2011 2012 2 013 2014) 2015 
Masculinity -0,024** -0,030** -0,028** -0,012 -0,020** -0,020* 
 
(0,011) (0,012) (0,012) (0,009) (0,009) (0,010) 
Globalization -0,029 -0,028 -0,014 -0,013 -0,015 -0,043 
 
(0,024) (0,025) (0,024) (0,021) (0,021) (0,026) 
GDP per capita -0,012* -0,013** -0,011** -0,005 -0,003 -0,011* 
 
(0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,005) (0,005) (0,006) 
School 0,183 0,075 0,056 0,090 0,146 0,198 
 
(0,157) (0,159) (0,148) (0,134) (0,133) (0,168) 
Institution 0,137 0,186 0,086 0,039 0,014 0,145 
 
(0,170) (0,177) (0,165) (0,149) (0,148) (0,176) 
Continental effect (dropped) (dropped) -0,996 -0,667 0,210 (dropped) 
Intercept  1,681 3,135 2,374 0,749 -0,048 1,320 
 
(2,000) (2,068) (1,994) (1,842) (1,504) (1,761) 
Obs 59 59 64 64 62 57 
Pseudo-R2  0.2117  0.2611 0.2204 0.0960 0.1098  0.1736 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
      
5. Addressing endogeneity 
Various empirical tests conducted so far have established a statistically significant 
and robust negative relationship between executive-controlled by women and 
masculinity. However, one can question the possibility of giving a causal 
interpretation to this finding because of the unobserved heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, reason likely to bias the results is in the measure of our variable of 
interest. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that survey data tend to bias the 
regression results when survey data are used as explanatory variables. For, 
differences in the interpretation of the questions asked can lead to a classical 
measurement error; which leads to a mitigation bias. In addition, these data are 
prone to measurement errors due to cognitive errors and the perceived social 
desirability of responses. 
However, the hypothesis of inverted causality is debatable. Indeed, having 
women in power can certainly influence many things. For example, Beaman et al. 
(2009) found that the presence of women in the power arcane has radically 
changed the perception of voters about the effectiveness of women in the role of 
authority. Having already had a village chief (pradhan) has lowered the 
importance of sexist stereotypes among male villagers in India. In a further study, 
Beaman et al. (2012) state that where there has never been a woman leader in the 
pradhan position, the difference between sons and daughters in terms of the 
wishes of the parents is great. Prakhan women increase the aspirations of parents 
for their daughters and those of girls for themselves. Kodila-Tedika (2013) find 
that significant female representation influences formal pro-women institutions. 
These studies may support only the hypothesis of reverse causality. However, one 
must not show a strong enthusiasm. Studies such as Beaman et al. (2009, 2012) 
are studies based on the randomization approach and thus present the weaknesses 
of its external validity and the durability of the effect found. Also, the effects of 
having women leaders are not always favourable to women. Clots-Figueras 
(2011), for example, presents some interesting results: women politicians from 
disadvantaged classes and tribes invest more in the social (education and health) 
and distribution on the one hand and laws promoting economic rights of women 
on the other hand. Furthermore, high caste of parliamentarians women have no 
impact on "pro-women" laws, and do not show high preference for the social as 
their counterparts. Kodila-Tedika & Asongu (2017) consider the case of a female 
leader, as head of the country. They did not find a fundamental shift in pro-
women institutions in Liberia during Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's tenure. Because of 
this, one must use caution in interpreting the results. A classic way to deal with 
the problem of reverse causality or omission bias is to use an instrumental 
variable, a source of exogenous variation, and estimate a 2SLS model. 
Fernandez (2010) documents the hypothesis of culture being passed from one 
generation to another. As a result, it is logical to think that people with a 
masculine or patriarchal culture have passed on this conception of life to their 
descendants. From this argument, we use the dummy of mulsuman countries as 
the first instrument. Indeed, the Islamic or mulsuman culture is not pro-woman. 
This is one of the reasons that is at the root of the movement of Islamic feminism 
(Kian-Thiébaut 2003, Badran 2010, Latte Abdallah 2010). Kholdi (1996) presents 
some sentences of the nationals of this part of the world, indicating the feminine 
passivity in these societies. 
"Islam does not recognize social equality between men and women. According to 
Islamic principles, men and women do not have equal rights [...]. According to 
the Koran, women are inferior to men and Islamic jurisprudence has recognized 
and codified gender differences: the price of blood for the murder of a Muslim 
woman is half that of a Muslim man; women inherit half of man's share; they are 
not allowed to travel or even leave the house without the permission of their 
husbands; men have the unilateral right to divorce; and only men can assume the 
religious and juridical direction [...]. In an Islamic society, a Muslim man enjoys 
the most complete social status. In such a society the superiority of man is not a 
social reality but a religious truth. 
 "God created the woman to do housework and to take care of the education of 
her children. God created man for external affairs, to face the problems of life " 
Whether this is a misinterpretation or not of the sacred texts of this religion, it is 
none the less true that these are so many "truths" that are overflowing in these 
societies (Kian-Thiébaut, 2003). 
In the literature, there are also several other instruments to cultural variables. In 
this case, we also used one of the instruments of Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(2011ab, 2016) and Ang (2015). Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011ab, 2016) use 
the blood distance from the UK as an instrument. Ang (2015), for his part, 
suggests that there is a link between culture and technology adoption variables of 
Comin et al. (2010). 
Table 8 shows the estimates of the last column (III) in Table 2, by instrumenting 
the masculinity variable according to the instruments identified. In the first 
column, we instrument by the dummy of Muslim countries. The blood distance 
from the UK and the technology adoption variable are used in columns 2 and 3 
respectively. The endogeneity bias visibly underestimated the magnitude of the 
coefficient of the variable of interest. This variable also gains in level of 
significance. The findings are similar to previous results obtained in this paper. 
  
Table 8.  Female of leader and Masculinity: IV Probit 
 
I II III 
Masculinity -0,054*** -0,055*** -0,060*** 
 
(0,015) (0,013) (0,006) 
Globalization -0,004 -0,007 0,003 
 
(0,025) (0,021) (0,015) 
GDP per capita -0,006 -0,007 -0,011** 
 
(0,010) (0,010) (0,005) 
School 0,119 0,105 0,155 
 
(0,127) (0,099) (0,131) 
Institution -0,079 -0,056 -0,116 
 
(0,223) (0,251) (0,088) 
Continental effect Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 2,321* 2,617* 2,072* 
 
(1,353) (1,376) (1,130) 
Obs 66 60 54 
Instrument Culture musilman Distance  Technology AD 1500 
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value)  0.7857 0.7060 0.3320 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
    
Conclusion 
Can we pretend that at the end of this research, have validated our hypothesis? 
First, it is worth remembering that the hypothesis tested in this article claims that 
culture is an indispensable element in political selection, especially when it comes 
to bringing women politicians to the head of the executive. Our contention is to 
bring empirical arguments to this hypothesis. We mobilized the ARCHIGOS data 
set of Goemans et al. (2009) to highlight on the presence of women at the head of 
the executive. 
Our econometric estimates suggest that an increase in the male culture level of 
10% degrades by almost 4 percentage points the probability of a female leader at 
the head of state. This conclusion is robust to sample change, econometric 
technique and other sensitivity tests. However, the probable relationship may 
suffer from reverse causality bias for many reasons. To take this into account, we 
have been able to show, through an instrumental probit model, that this 
relationship is causal. 
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